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INTRODUCTION
While most scholars would agree that minimal human rights
standards exist, the correct implementation of such standards is a
topic of hot debate. In light of recent international conflicts, the
relationship between religion and human rights, and in particular
Islam and human rights, is a pressing topic. Some political
commentators favor applying Western human rights principles on a
universal scale; however, using this singular view to determine
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which rights deserve primary focus may impinge upon other
fundamental societal rights.
The better view is to allow each community, including those that
are Muslim, to build upon its inherent moral base, rather than to
impose outside morals that may or may not reflect the popular
consensus.' Nearly all successful assertions of human rights are
achieved because of struggles from within, not from without.2
Admittedly, allowing religious discourse into political debate may
have a tendency to politicize religious thought. Nevertheless, the
international community can mitigate this tendency by opening a
forum for all religious views.3
For most Muslims, Islam is a religion that allows and requires free
speech, democratic participation, and tolerance. 4 Several notable
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. PELETZ, ISLAMIC MODERN: RELIGIOUS COURTS AND
CULTURAL POLITICS IN MALAYSIA 3 (2002) (claiming that Malaysian Islamic

courts play a key role both in defining Islam's role in modem society and in
creating a proving ground for ongoing struggles concerning ethnic groups,
religious communities, social classes, and political parties). Peletz characterizes
Islam in Malaysia as quite pluralistic. Id. at 6.
2. See Richard W. Bulliet, Rhetoric, Discourse, and the Future of Hope, in
ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 1, 10-11 (Richard W. Bulliet ed.,
Proceedings of a Conference held at Colum. Univ. June 1993) (1994) (maintaining
that the West has "arrived at [its] current conceptions of society and government"
as a result of internal struggles and concluding that the Muslim world will likely
undergo a similar experience).
3. See Christian Moe, Strasbourg's Construction of Islam: A Critique of the
Refah Judgment, 11-12 (May 22, 2002) (draft paper on file with American
University International Law Review) (stating that, contrary to popular
perceptions, Islam has historically protected individual rights and freedoms),
available at http://folk.uio.no/chrismoe/papers/StrasbourgIslam.vla.rtf
(last
visited Jan. 26, 2004). For instance, during the Ottoman Empire, the Young
Ottomans used tenets of the Islamic faith to promote constitutionalism and limited
parliamentarianism. Id. at 13.
4. See id. at 19; see also Gamal M. Badr, A Survey of Islamic International
Law, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 99 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn
Evans eds., 1999) (arguing that Islam may reinforce Western ideals by
emphasizing higher ethics and the concept that an individual's own efforts are
more important than the individual's membership in a select group, or the
individual's reliance on another's supreme sacrifice). Badr maintains that Islamic
laws have contributed to international law in ways implicating human rights, for
instance, in the practice of treating aliens as individuals rather than as subjects or
foreign nationals. Id. He further contends that "[c]ontemporary Islamic legal
thought has no trouble subscribing to all current principles of international law"
UNDER SIEGE:
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nations, including Israel, India, Malaysia, and Nigeria, create a
balance between religious group rights and other rights by allowing
religious communities to govern certain affairs of their members.' In
such countries, religious law governs only in areas of personal and
family law, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, where
individuals consider their right to religious autonomy and privacy
paramount.6
The success of these legal systems is mixed. As an outsider in
these countries, my personal perception of such a government
organization seems a poor baseline for determining any such
scheme's effectiveness. Nevertheless, outsiders have exerted
considerable influence on the world view of these legal systems,
especially in the Muslim world. For instance, in the decision Refah
Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, the European

Court of Human Rights suggested that a system in which Islamic
religious courts adjudicated personal issues for Muslims in an
Islamic country could never be consistent with democracy or the
protection of basic human rights.7
This case left open an important question of whether Islamic
religious courts do in fact adequately protect basic human rights. An
even more important question, however, especially as Muslims
throughout the world attempt to exercise their rights to religious
freedom and self-determination, is whether Islam is even compatible
with international conceptions of human rights. While the Western
world is enamored with individual rights, much of the rest of the

and may actually "enrich international law with its own contributions." Id. at 100-

01.
5. See Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a
Frameworkfor Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 795, 834-36

(1992) (explaining that some nations retain religious law when resolving matters of
personal status, such as marriage or family issues).
6. See id.

7. See Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, 35 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 56 (2001) (holding that that the Turkish Party was justified in dissolving an
Islamic political party whose aims were inconsistent with a democratic society),
aff'd 13 Feb. 2003, available at 2001 WL 1819833. The court found that the legal
system proposed by Refah would actually unfairly separate citizens based on their
religious beliefs. Id. at 85-86.

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[19:485

world, including the Islamic world, appears to value group rights
more than individual rights.8
To determine how a system of Islamic religious courts would fare
with regard to rights protection, the first inquiry must be to determine
what sort of rights are worthy of protecting. Thus, Part I of this paper
considers the notions of individual and group rights, in particular
focusing on the compatibility of Islamic notions of rights with
Western views. Following this initial analysis, Part II looks at some
of the problems inherent in systems where religious law governs
religious adherents, focusing on Israel as a case study. Part III
considers the particular difficulties with the application of the
Islamic law of Shari'a in a predominately Muslim country. Part IV
concludes that, while difficulties are inherent in any system where
religious law governs, the answers to reconciling religion and human
rights must be found within religion rather than without. Considering
the diverse views of Muslims on the compatibility of Islam with
international human rights, the best solution to incorporating Islam in
democracy appears to be to create a forum for debate both inside and
outside the religion.

I. THE BALANCE OF GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN A RELIGIOUS COURT SYSTEM
A. THE BALANCE OF RIGHTS
One difficulty in marrying Islamic ideals with Western notions of
democracy is that Western and Islamic societies possess somewhat
differing notions of what constitutes core human rights.9 Under a
simplistic, general view, one can categorize human rights into two

8. See Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic
Law, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 349, 371 (1996) (discussing the difference between the

importance of individualism in Western culture and the emphasis on community
welfare in Islamic societies).
9. See Muhammad Tal'at Al-Ghunaimi, Justice and Human Rights in Islam,
in JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 1, 5-6 (Gerald E. Lampe ed.,

1997) (comparing major Western human rights treaties with Islamic human rights
instruments and explaining that in the West, human rights only benefit the
inhabitants of those countries that are parties to international conventions, whereas
Islamic law extends the benefits to all humankind).
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classes: individual rights and group rights. Individual rights include
those that protect a person's individual autonomy and freedom, such
as freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and freedom to
engage in ordinary occupations of life. Group rights are those* that
protect a set of people, such as the right to self-determination and the
rights of minority groups. Although, as one can readily imagine,
these rights are inextricably linked to each other, general
governmental trends emerge based on which type of right a given
community emphasizes.' 0
For instance, Western democratic models tend to align themselves
with a strong belief in the importance of individual rights, seeing
such rights as being "inherent in man's existence."" Some Western
commentators explain that a society can only truly realize human
rights through a liberal democracy that emphasizes the rights of the
individual. 2 On the other hand, under a traditional Islamic model, the
primary purpose of human rights is collective - that of benefiting all
of mankind.' 3 Thus, individual rights are tied to the individual duties
4
to society as a whole.'

The Islamic concept of rights should not seem foreign even to
Western individualists, however. While individual rights may be
central to Western society, it is well understood that a person may
only exercise his or her individual rights to the extent that the
exercise of those rights does not impinge upon the individual rights
10. See Arzt, supra note 8, at 371-72 (explaining that because Islam places
great emphasis on community, dissent is often considered contrary to the Islamic
faith).
11. Al-Ghunaimi, supra note 9, at 11; see also Roger Ruston, Theologians,
Humanists and Natural Rights, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 14, 15
(Mark Hill ed., 2002) (noting the development of "natural rights" out of
theological roots).
12. See Lisa Anderson, Islam and Human Rights: Is There a Right to Be
Wrong?, in UNDER SIEGE: ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 41, 48
(arguing that human rights and democracy are "inextricably linked" and that only
democracy, which "assumes self-governing individuals," fosters the exchange of
information and free expression).
13. See A1-Ghunaimi, supra note 9, at 6 (comparing Western and Islamic
conceptions of human rights and noting that under the Islamic model "the benefit
of human rights protections extend to all humankind.").
14. See id. (discussing the reciprocal process whereby the state and individual
owe human rights and human duties to each other, respectively).
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of others. Furthermore, the realization of individual rights, even in
Western culture, occurs only as individuals relate to their society and
surroundings. I
A society cannot achieve justice by neglecting to take account of
both models of human rights. 16 However, no perfect recipe exists for
mixing the two. Somewhere between the overemphasis of either
group or individual rights exists an area of permissible regulation
where a society can achieve justice, despite differences in the precise
balance. The goal should be for each nation to find a balance
between individual and group interests that reflects its own particular
morality.
A nation seeking the protection of human rights will never be
successful unless it takes into account its own unique values and
culture - its morality. In any society, "[p]ower is sustained only on a
moral basis."17 Building government upon the prevailing morality
opens the door for constitutionalism and stability." The public
15. See James Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in InternationalLaw:
Its Development and Future, in PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 7, 8 (Philip Alston ed., 2001)
(explaining the international law tradition that individuals "exist neither in a pure
vacuum nor in a pure flux, but in a society").
16. See Muhammad Fathi Al-Dirini, Justice in the Islamic Shari'a, in JUSTICE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 9, at 43, 44 (asserting that the
overemphasis of either group rights or individual rights to the exclusion and
detriment of the other results in a loss of justice). A society emphasizing an
individual's personal rights without considering the impact of that individual's
rights on society as a whole will succumb to selectivity and factionalism. Id. A
society neglecting individual rights in favor of group rights will lose its ability to
provide justice for individuals. Id. The better way to conceive of individual and
group rights is to recognize their interrelation. Thus, individuals exercising their
individual rights have a duty to respect the interests of others, regardless of
whether they are other individuals or society at large. Id. Because public and
private interests are inextricably tied to one another, neither right can take
precedent. Id. Islamic scholars who seek to illustrate how Islam can protect
individual rights while still protecting the public interest rely upon this conception.
Id.
17. Noor ul-Amin Leghari, The Concept of Justice and Human Rights in Islam,
in JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 9, at 51, 52.
18. See id. (discussing Plato's placement of "the good" at the top of his
hierarchy of ideas and explaining that power gained using immoral, unjust means
"cannot be maintained over time and is consequently contrary to the evolution of
society"); see also JOHN R. ROWAN, CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS: MORAL THEORY AND
SOCIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 5 (1999) (explaining that societies that consider
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morality, or "what is right and proper," 9 informs positive law, which
enforces what is right to the extent it bears upon an individual's
relationship to society. z In the ideal sense, then, when tension
between law and morals does occur in a democratic government,

public opinion can step in to urge changes and bring the law more in
line with the current prevailing morals.2 '
A government that allows public morals to inform positive laws
adheres more closely to international law notions of human rights
than a government that imposes morality from above. 2 Human
dignity requires personal moral choice. 23 For instance, although the
classic Western model protects individual choice even when group
interests do not benefit from that choice,24 individual choice often
expresses itself through the group efforts of political parties and

other interest groups. Group desires inform democratic freedoms.
Likewise, in the non-Western world, only by drawing upon its own
particular background and circumstances can any nation determine

how best to balance group and individual rights.

themselves enlightened have a tendency to find their constitutions "morally
justified").
19. Leghari, supra note 17, at 52.
20. See ROWAN, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing the philosophical relationship
between morality and law and asserting "that which is morally required.., should
inform that which is legally required").
21. See id. (arguing that the United States adopted Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution in large part because of the moral belief that the
Constitution, as previously written, failed to adequately protect individual rights).
22. See ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND

POLITICS 160 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that international human rights law is based on
the idea that "individuals are the best judges of their own interests, because
individuals ultimately have greater insight into what they need to be happy than do
any other persons or institutions").
23. See id. (declaring that part of human dignity and self-respect is founded
upon freedom of choice, which is a fundamental right),
24. See id. (stating that international law favors the protecting individual choice
over group or institutional choice, even though the expression of choice may be
occur through a collective forum).
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B. RIGHTS IN ISLAM
"[T]he human rights movement has met with a mixed and
sometimes hostile reaction in the Muslim world. '25 Human rights
under Islam are founded on a long history of traditions and religious
practices and only sometimes correspond to contemporary Western
notions of human rights. 26 Thus, nations who wish to integrate
Islamic ideals into their modem democratic governments may find
27
themselves at an intersection between apparently contrary policies.
Often human rights under international norms and human rights
under Islam are reconcilable, but a tension persists and requires both
the international community and Muslim nations to reconsider
whether their particular paradigms reflect their actual beliefs.28
As the foregoing overview of rights suggests, a society is likely to
be more effective in discovering a working balance between group
and individual rights if it draws the balance from its own unique
morality. One difficulty with combining Islamic values with Western
rights terminology is that those who attempt to do so often try to
effect change by placing Western terminology onto existing Islamic
traditions, rather than creating a new human rights terminology

25. David L. Neal & Ashraful Hasan, Distinctions Between Muslims and
Dhimmis: The Human Rights of Non-Muslims Under Islamic Law, in HUMAN
RIGHTS DILEMMAS IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 9, 10 n.4
(Ashraful Hasan ed., 1998) (noting that some jurists believe Islamic law is
incompatible with international law and the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights while others argue that because no agreement exists among Muslims,
nothing precludes them from adopting international norms).
26. See id. at 10-11 (asserting that Islamic traditions and religious beliefs
provide for a "rich network of rights" under Islamic law, which occasionally
reflects the rights identified by contemporary international law).
27. See id. at 11 (stating that due to certain conceptual tensions between
Islamic law and international law, the dilemma underlying the incorporation of
Islamic principles into the modem nation-state is difficult to resolve). This problem
has existed since the inception of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Id.
28. See id. at 11-12 (arguing that the international community must "consider
what Islamic laws and Muslim nations define as rights, be they human, political, or
social," and the Muslim community must "reflect on whether current
interpretations of Islamic law remain true to the universality of the Prophet's
message and whether Islamic law can learn and draw from the norms and
standards of international human rights").
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derived from Islam.29 While it is certainly possible that traditionally
Western notions of democracy can be compatible with Islamic
principles," a system of rights governance will last only if based
upon the prevailing morals of the people it governs. 3' Thus, Islamic
scholars would be better off examining their own morals, rather than
merely studying Western notions of democracy.32 This section
considers the importance of rights and the role of the state under an
Islamic model.
While the premise of modem Western democracy is an
assumption that self-governing individuals are a "necessary, though
not sufficient, condition for the basic institutions of liberal
democratic politics," 33 Islam begins with the premise that individuals

have obligations to each other, without which individual rights are
unachievable.34 Individual and group rights are capable of mutually
reinforcing each other; a person can fulfill his or her duty to protect
the rights of others without undermining his or her individual
rights.35
This relationship between rights and duties under Islam stems
from the idea that human rights are a divine endowment mankind has

29. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 62 (describing the confusion Islamic human
rights scholars encounter while dealing with Western-derived notions of human
rights). Mayer explains that these scholars "have no sure grasp of what the

concerns of human rights really are." Id.
30. It should be noted that the use of the word "Western" to describe a
particular strand of democracy is by no means intended to convey the impression
that other viable strands of democracy do not, or cannot, exist.
31. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 48 (indicating that in the West the concept
of democracy has assumed "self-governing individuals").
32. See id. (noting hypocrisy in the fact that "[m]any political movements and
actors in the Islamic world today describe themselves as democrats, while

repudiating human rights").
33. Id. Anderson suggests that "these premises... are not consistent with
liberal democracy." Id. Nevertheless, she admits that "other monotheistic
traditions, including Roman Catholicism," share such premises. Id.
34. See Leghari, supra note 17, at 61 (indicating the codependent nature of
both fulfilling responsibilities towards others and maintaining individual rights
under the Islamic model).
35. See id. ("Undue insistence on one at the cost of the other very often upsets
the delicate balance so necessary in social morality.").
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possessed since its creation.36 However, at the time of their creation,
human beings received not only these rights, but also "a code of
social conduct which contained a clear concept of... obligations."37
Included in this code of conduct is the duty for Muslims to represent
'justice in its noblest form"38 by showing compassion and concern
for all people.3 9 If this "right of Allah" 4° conflicts with an
individual's private interests, the public good and the welfare of
others take precedence. 4'
Because rights are a divine investiture, the state can neither grant
nor remove such rights; consequently, it may only protect and
enforce them. 42 The state possesses no greater authority than the
individuals it governs and is merely a "coexistent recipient of divine
injunctions. '43 The state's goal is to prioritize the public interest,
while infringing upon individual rights as little as possible.' Each
36. See id. at 54-55 (discussing the idea that human rights are conferred on an
individual "on the basis of his inclusion in the universal brotherhood of mankind");
see also id. at 56 ("Since sovereignty in Islam belongs to Almighty Allah,
fundamental rights emanate. from Him ....The State has neither the unilateral
authority to award these rights nor the jurisdiction to abrogate, amend, or suspend
them.").
37. Id. at 54; see also id. at 54, 61 (citing the QUR'AN 2:31-33 relating to issues
of morality).
38. Al-Dirini, supra note 16, at 48.
39. See id. (outlining the ways in which the Shari'a classifies public duties,
including the duty to show regard for public interest).
40. Id.
41. See id. (describing the general hierarchy of public over individual interest
established when individual rights collide with public duties); see also, Anderson,
supra note 12, at 47-48 (indicating the precedence the group or family takes over
the individual's desires).
42. See Leghari, supra note 17, at 54-55 (noting that because human rights are
conferred to an individual at birth, they are considered inalienable and thus the
state cannot revoke them). Such a concept should not be entirely foreign to
Western notions of fundamental rights and natural justice. See, e.g., Ruston, supra
note 14, at 23-24 (discussing the Western understanding of basic human rights and
explaining that its foundation rests in the idea that such rights are bestowed upon
"every people on earth" since all were created in the image of God).
43. Leghari, supra note 17, at 56.
44. See AI-Dirini, supra note 16, at 44 ("It is obvious, however, that in
balancing interests, the State will inevitably give first priority to the public interest,
while abrogating the interest of the individual to the least extent possible.").
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Muslim has the duty to assist the state in the realization of both types
of rights.45
In Islam, no dichotomy exists between law, morality, and human
rights.46 Thus, in an ideal Islamic state, "justice" is more than "an
abstract and philosophical intellectual concept"; it is a goal reached
through legislation and other rules that "promote the moral and
material needs of society."47 Additionally, justice turns on whether an
act corresponds to or contradicts with the tenets of Islam. 8 God has
perfect knowledge and wisdom; thus, divine revelation is viewed as a
more reliable source of knowledge than fallible human reason.49
Laws "are rooted in compelling social reason and aim at the
achievement of a basic, collective good and the welfare of human
beings."50
Despite this reliance on morality in Islamic society, whether an
Islamic state is necessary to "the establishment of a coherent
relationship among religion, ethics and law to achieve justice"51 is
debatable. While the popular belief is that Muslims require such a
state, some scholars argue that a theocratic Islamic regime is
unnecessary and would even be contrary to notions of Islamic justice
and law.5 In many instances, attempts at Islamic theocracies have

45. See id. at 48 (outlining the necessary balance between individual rights and
public duties in Shari'a law).
46. See Liaquat Ali Siddiqui, The Conception of Justice: Western and Islamic,
in JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 9, at 23; 41 (indicating

that in Islam, rather than dividing law, morality, and rights into separate categories,
the "theory of justice explains everything in the light of one divine scheme").
47. Al-Dirini, supra note 16, at 44.
48. See Siddiqui, supra note 46, at 29 ("Allah, the Almighty, is the supreme
law-giver in Islam .... Therefore, His direction is bound to be just, although we
do or do not realise the meaning and purpose of these directions by our limited
knowledge.").
49. See id. at 41 (citing QUR'AN 2:32 and explaining why the Islamic

conception of justice cannot distinguish law, morality, and rights from one
another).
50. Ali Bardakoglu, The Concept of Justice in Islamic Jurisprudence, in
supra note 9, at 65, 74.

JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW,

51. Id. at 67.
52. See id. (arguing that while "justice" in Islam is a religious or ethical value,

a society that is subject to legislation or governance by the clergy cannot realize
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resulted in fewer individual freedoms not because of a failing of
Islam itself, but because allegedly devout leaders have placed their
personal, individual rights above the good of the community.
In any case, for the community to follow divine revelation requires
someone must determine what constitutes revelation and how to
interpret revelation received - thus, the development of the various
schools of Islam and the diversity in how different Islamic countries
interpret the balance between law and morality. 3 This heterogeneity
merely evidences the ability of Muslims to engage in a religious
discourse. Applying human rights norms under Islamic law depends
on human reason and the ability for Islam to incorporate traditional
ideals into the modem public ethic.54
In fact, Islam shares several ideals with Western notions of justice,
including human dignity, fundamental human rights, ideas of natural
justice, and the rule of law." Even though the Western, developed
world appears to currently protect individual rights more effectively
than the Islamic world, one could argue that this protection is not due
to the human rights interpretations of Western countries but due to
the stability of the constitutional regimes of those particular
countries.56

that value). Islam stresses "the establishment of a coherent relationship among
religion, ethics and [positive] law to achieve justice." Id.
53. See Sherman A. Jackson, Shari'ah, Democracy, and the Modern NationState: Some Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, and Pluralism, 27 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 88, 94-95 (2003) (discussing the role of Islamic jurists' interpretive
authority when deciding issues under Islamic law and asserting that Islamic law is
not necessarily at odds with notions of democratic governance).
54. See id. at 78 ("Application of concepts of Islam displays different
manifestations in different societies and remains valid for every society and age");
cf ROBERT W. HEFNER, CIVIL ISLAM: MUSLIMS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN
INDONESIA 9 (2000) (discussing the influence of congregational Christianity on the
development of Western democracy).
55. See Siddiqui, supra note 46, at 41-42 (comparing and contrasting Western
and Islamic conceptions of justice); see also Bardakoglu, supra note 50, at 69 ("It
may be asserted that the principles of natural law, as developed throughout the
ages, forming the basis of legal thought in the Western world, is in harmony with
the general principles of Islamic religion.").
56. See Leghari, supra note 17, at 58 (citing the American constitutional
structure as one example of a constitutional regime that has successfully fought for
the preservation of individual rights).
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In any case, Islamic countries will only be able to achieve
democracy by examining their notions of morality and incorporating
those notions into a system that protects the rights of both groups and
individuals. 7 Even Muslim democrats that do not desire an Islamic
state "insist that society involves more than autonomous
individuals[;] ... [it involves the kind of] democracy that encourages

citizens to respect the rights of others as well as to cherish their
58
own.

1I. RELIGIOUS COURTS IN THE NON-MUSLIM
WORLD
In countries where Islam is not the prevalent religion, the use of
religious law to govern the personal affairs of religious adherents has
had mixed success.5 9 One recurring problem in such countries is that
by granting religious groups the autonomy to govern the personal
affairs of their members, religious coercion that infringes upon the
citizens' individual rights is a likely outcome.6° While religious
groups argue that their right to self-determination necessitates
allowing them to establish their own systems of law with regard to
personal status issues, some members of the community may feel
forced to live up to religious standards in which they do not fully
believe.6 '
An illustrative example is Israel, where religious courts have
existed since Ottoman times and religious tribunals adjudicate
57. See HEFNER, supra note 54, at 13 (noting that even a "real-and-existing
democracy must always find ways to accommodate social as well as individual
goods").
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in Israel and Iran: How the
Integration of Secular and Spiritual Laws Affects Human Rights and the Potential
for Violence, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 156 (1997) (presenting the development of

Judaic law in Israel).
60. See Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Family and Inheritance Law, in

INTRODUCTION TO

THE LAW OF ISRAEL 75, 101 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995)

(discussing the role of religion in the family law arena in Israel).
61. See infra Part III.C for a further discussion of conversion in Islam
(explaining that while this problem seems to have a clear answer - allow
conversion - in faiths such as Islam some adherents find such a course of action
unacceptable).
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personal matters.62 In Israel, not all religious communities are even
recognized by the State or have independent religious tribunals.63
Except in limited circumstances, non-believers and those who do not
belong to a recognized religious group suffer hardships in matters of
personal status because no secular law exists regarding marriages, no
secular Officials have authority to perform marriages, and civil courts
have little or no jurisdiction over marriage and divorce.'
Second, and even more important, inequities may arise even
within particular religious communities. 65 For instance, in Israel,
members of non-Orthodox sects of Judaism in particular oppose the
power of Jewish rabbinical courts because they are controlled by the
Orthodox Jewish community, despite the fact that Judaism in Israel
is very heterogeneous when contrasted to other Israeli religions.66
Additionally, non-religious Jews resent being subject to the

62. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 493, 495 (2d ed. 2000) (commenting on
Israeli religious courts' jurisdiction in personal matters); see also David Stephens,
Religious Courts in Israel 2 (Apr. 22, 1981) (unpublished paper, on file with the
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, Brigham Young University) (detailing the history
of law under Ottoman rule in Palestine and noting that "religious communities
were granted autonomy in matters of personal status.").
63. See Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Religion and of Conscience in Israel, 47
U. L. REv. 441, 462 (1998) (discussing the "recognized" and
"unrecognized" religious communities in Israel). The recognized religious
communities include Islam, Eastern Orthodox, Latin Catholic, Gregorian
Armenian, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Chaldean Uniate, Greek CatholicMelkite, Maronite, Syrian Orthodox, Druze, Episcopal-Evangelical, and Baha'i. Id.
Notable excluded communities include Christian Monophysites, ProtestantLutherans, Baptists, and Quakers, as well as other religions that form a part of the
Jewish community. Id.
64. See id. at 464 (noting the disadvantages to non-believers and members of
unrecognized religious groups)
65. See id. (stating that while the Jewish population in Israel is quite
heterogeneous, the State of Israel has "in fact given the Orthodox movement a
monopoly over official activities, namely the registration of marriages and
jurisdiction in matters of personal status [which] has engendered resentment from
members of other movements").
66. See id. at 463-64 (discussing some of the issues that have caused
controversy in the state of Israel); see also Strong, supra note 59, at 156 ("Because
the Orthodox have traditionally controlled the rabbinical courts, they have been
able to impose their version of Judaism on Israel almost uniformly, despite the fact
that Orthodox Judaism is not the majority Jewish*denomination in Israel.").
CATH.
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rabbinical courts' exclusive authority in certain issues, "consider[ing]
it a case of religious coercion. '"67
Depth of belief has no part in a person's being subject to the
jurisdiction of a religious court.68 For example, regardless of their
status as true believers, agnostics, or atheists, Jewish courts pass
judgment on ethnic Jews. 69 Because civil court jurisdiction in matters
of marriage and divorce exists only in rare circumstances, individuals
must go through the religious system to establish a family unit.70
Although Israeli Jews may still leave Israel to be married, thus
avoiding Orthodox requirements, doing so imposes a heavy financial
burden that conflicts with the fundamental right to establish a
family.7" Additionally, if a matter concerning personal status arises in
a civil case before a civil court with jurisdiction, that court will apply
religious law rather than civil law.72
Israel attempts to protect its citizens from overreaching religious
courts by providing a right to appeal, both within and without the
religious court system.73 First, a party may appeal decisions to higher
67. Lapidoth, supra note 63, at 463.
68. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 59, at 139 (stating that "[r]abbinical courts
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all Jews and apply Halachic law, regardless of
whether the persons before them practice or believe in the tenets of Judaism.").
69. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 62, at 495 (explaining that even
secular, non-believing Jews and Muslims in Israel must be married under the
relevant religious law).
70. See Strong, supra note 59, at 139 (commenting that religious courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over issues of marriage and divorce as well as concurrent
jurisdiction with civil courts regarding other matters of personal status). However,
because Israeli law allows members of non-recognized religious communities to
obtain a divorce in the civil courts, the law results in the "absurdity" that members
of unrecognized religious groups, such as Protestants, may only marry in Israel
under the laws of another religious group (usually Protestants are married by
Catholic priests), but they may still dissolve their marriages in the civil courts. Id.;
see also Rosen-Zvi, supra note 60, at 101 (noting that civil courts are unsure of
what law to apply to those persons who are not members of recognized religious
communities).
71. See Strong, supra note 59, at 156-57 (highlighting the challenges of trying
to avoid Orthodox rites).
72. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 62, at 495
often takes precedent over civil law in matters regarding
73. See Moe, supra note 3, at 7-8 (discussing the
system in Turkey). Nevertheless, non-religious Jews

(noting that religious law

personal status),
proposed pluralistic legal
would probably find this
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religious tribunals.74 Second, a party may also appeal religious court
decisions to the High Court of Justice ("High Court").7 5 Although the
High Court's power of review is confined statutorily to reviewing
jurisdictional issues, it also reviews violations of natural law

principles, procedural rules, and judicial trust and ethics principles
that apply to civil law judges. The High Court may also review the
religious court's disregard of laws which the High Court has

interpreted to specifically apply to religious courts.76
However, errors in applying religious law are not appealable in
civil courts and the High Court "usually refrains from intervening
pursuant to its restriction policy concerning review of judgments of

specific professional tribunals.

77

Thus, the portion of a religious

group with control and influence in appointing religious judges,
which in the case of Judaism is the Orthodox Jewish population, may
control the path of the law.7"

safeguard to offer little protection. Id. at 9-10 (recognizing the inherent
discrimination in such a system and suggesting that an effective appellate process
has the potential of being an effective safeguard in any system of religious courts
only if equal protection also protects against discriminatory effects of religious
court adjudication).
74. See Stephens, supra note 62, at 5 (noting that both the Muslim and
Rabbinic court systems have established courts of appeal, while among the
Christian courts only the Greek Orthodox system has an established appellate court
system); see also SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI
JUDICIARY 106-07 (1994) (stating that the Rabbinical Court of Appeals was
somewhat controversial, at least at the time of its establishment, among Orthodox
Jews, who believed that Rabbinical Court decisions should be final).
75. See SHETREET, supra note 74, at 106 (discussing-the appellate procedures
of the religious courts in Israel).
76. See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 60, at 90 (commenting on judicial control over
the religious courts in Israel).
77. SHETREET, supra note 74, at 106; see also Stephens, supra note 62, at 6
(stating that "religious courts can control their decisions because there is no appeal
to civil courts for an error in the application of religious law.").
78. See Stephens, supra note 62, at 6-7 (indicating that the influence of
Orthodox Judaism results in difficulties for other Jewish groups similar to those
experienced by Israelis unaffiliated with any religious group). For instance, the
Orthodox Jewish courts have prohibited marriages with members of other Jewish
communities, even though such restricted communities are recognized as Jews by
all other members of the faith. Id.

2004]

WESTERN DEMOCRACY & ISLAMIC TRADITION

This system may coerce individuals into adhering to religious
views that they do not espouse. While allowing religious tribunals to
determine matters of personal status for those within their fold
arguably grants such religious groups autonomy to create a religious
environment, in reality, for the Jewish population, the religious sect
with the most power effectively determines the meaning of the
religion for all adherents. Thus, Orthodox Jews, who have a
monopoly on Rabbinical law, can effectively "impose halachic
principles on all Jews within the State of Israel, whether they
personally believe in Orthodox Judaism or not."79
Furthermore, such coercion seems to serve no effective purpose
other than to allow Orthodox Jews the ability to fulfill their
perceived "religious responsibility to nonreligious Jews.""s The
majority suggests that infringing upon the rights of minority groups
"is necessary to protect the morals of the State or the religious
character of the nation."'" However, those Jews who are devout and
wish to be part of the community will conform to religious rules by
choice, not needing secular, civil retribution to ensure conformance. 2
It appears the only remaining reason for requiring status questions,
such as marriage, to be determined under Rabbinical law is to
"coerce non-Orthodox Jews into behaving in accordance with the
Halacha."83 Such reasoning is contrary to fundamental freedom of
religion principles that should exist in any democracy.84
Thus, the religious court system as it currently exists in Israel may
actually hinder, rather than aid, religious autonomy by requiring
minority religious groups to take part in the larger group's collective

79. Strong, supra note 59, at 158.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 197. Such a view suggests that "the moral and religious sensibilities
of their citizens are harmed by knowing that others are acting in an immoral
manner." Id.
82. See id. at 158 (noting that religious Jews will act in accordance with
religious tenants by choice).
83. Id.
84. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 62, at 493 (stating that the State of

Israel guarantees freedom of religion and democracy).
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morals rather than following their own consciences. 5 Discrimination
results from such a system despite the attempt to create "separate but
equal religio-legal systems within the State" because, unless they
want to experience burdens on their religious practice, individuals
may only belong to recognized religions. 6
One could argue that the majority should simply establish
opportunities "for dissenters to exit the culture." 7 Nevertheless,
aside from "divid[ing] the nation by segregating it, into discrete
religious territories,"8 8 such an attempt would be pragmatically
unreasonable. 8 9 Religious observance is as varied as the individual.
To truly grant freedom of religion every individual needs an
automatic right to opt out of the religious court system. 90 Creating
such a right would undermine the very reasons for the religious court
system in the first place. 9 1
Even assuming that a society could implement a system in which
religious groups could not exert undue political coercion and
influence, social coercion will still exist in religiously-dominated
nations.9 2 For instance, in India's Shah Bano case, a husband
abruptly divorced his wife of forty years.93 The Court awarded the

85. See id. at 495 (noting that religious courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
citizens regardless of religious affiliation).
86. Strong, supra note 59, at 197.
87. Id. at 198.
88. Id.
89. See id. (suggesting that if the majority provided the dissenters with a form
of escape, it would further divide the nation resulting in inherent instability and
violence between the groups).
90. See id. (realizing that those with religious preferences different from those
of the prevailing majority should have the option of exiting the current systems).
91. See Strong, supra note 59, at 197 (implying that secularism further divides
nations and will ultimately lead to internal instability and violence).
92. Admittedly, it may be difficult to eliminate such social coercion, and a
discussion of such elimination may be beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, a system where people are divided on religious grounds may tend to
reinforce differences that are difficult to overcome when compared to the
geographical divisions that occur in most democratib societies.
93. See Moe, supra note 3, at 8 (summarizing the facts and holding of the Shah
Bano case); see also Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399,
1427-28 (2003) (discussing the controversy surrounding the case because it
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wife alimony and her husband appealed to India's Supreme Court,
alleging that he was not obligated to pay because he fulfilled his
duties under Muslim Personal Law.94 In 1985, the Supreme Court of
India affirmed the lower court's ruling by relying on "a provision of
the Criminal Procedure95 Code stipulating 'the maintenance of wife,
children and parents.'
Nevertheless, after the Court decided Shah Bano, the ruling
political party, the Congress Party, introduced the 1986 Muslim
Women (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act, that in effect reversed
the Supreme Court's judgment by requiring "a divorced Muslim
women's former husband only to return the Mahr and pay
maintenance during the period of iddat. ' ' 96 Thus, despite the Supreme
Court's attempt to protect the wife's individual rights, the cultural
norms of the majority regarding maintenance prevailed in the end.97

III. RELIGIOUS COURTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD
While tensions between group and individual rights clearly exist in
any system of religious courts, this tension is even more apparent in

contradicted previous lower court rulings affirming a husband's right to support his
ex-wife for only three months after the divorce).
94. See Moe, supra note 3, at 8-9 (demonstrating the conflict between Muslim
and secular law in India); see also Sunder, supra note 93, at 1427 (noting that the
Hindu judge in the Shah Bano case expressly rejected Muslim law in his ruling).
95. Moe, supra note 3, at 9.
96. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, supra note 62, at 509 (asserting
that the Congress Party was motivated by its conclusion "that the judgment was a
political liability for it"). The passage of this act
in fact intensified rather than resolved the problems created by the Shah Bano
judgment. The Indian government continues the process of drafting a uniform
civil code covering these matters to satisfy feminists and progressives, while
the Hindu political right has also pressed on the issue of a uniform civil code
for its own political reasons. Leaders of the Hindu right talked of the
offensive stand of the Muslim community which opposed the Shah Bano
judgment, and argued that the uniform civil code was a vital means of
protecting the national sovereignty.
Id.
97. See id. at 510 (emphasizing the importance and often controlling value of
cultural norms over codified law).

504

AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.

[19:485

the Islamic world.98 As discussed above, Islam strongly emphasizes
the duties of members towards society, rather than the individual
rights members gain from society. 99 As a result, a danger exists that
individuals will not achieve the full realization of individual rights. 00
In particular, there is a risk of state mistreatment with respect to
the non-Muslims and Muslims who wish to convert away from the
Muslim faith. This section discusses the Islamic law of Shari'a and
addresses each of these potential problems.
A. BACKGROUND: THE LAW OF SHARI'A
Before moving to the broader issues of whether a system of
Islamic religious courts could adequately protect human rights, it is
important to consider what law would govern in such courts. The
Shari'a, the Islamic law derived from the Qur'an and the Prophet
Muhammad's example, 0' is broadly defined as "the Way of the
Muslims in the sense of the divine law and the proper ordering of
society on earth."'0° It provides guidelines for external and secular
acts involving the community, as well as both individual and group
religious acts, such as worship, almsgiving, and acts involving the
other pillars of the Islamic faith. 103 Thus, the Shari'a embodies the

98. See supra notes 12-15 (describing the often conflicting definitions of
human rights in Western and Islamic cultures).
99. See Al-Ghunaimi, supra note 9, at 6 (emphasizing that the primary purpose
of human rights is to benefit society as a whole).
100. See id. (realizing that nations will compromise individual rights if it
benefits the state as a whole).
101. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015,
1022 (1991) (emphasizing that because in pre-modem Islam all "law" derived
from God, secular and religious law could never come into conflict).
102. FREDERICK MATHEWSON DENNY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 231 (2d ed.

1994). Denny defines this "way" as the method and creed of Muslims and explains
that the Qur'an describes Shari'a as "enjoining the right and forbidding the
wrong." Id.
103. See id. at 201 (stressing that Islamic law is internalized within the
community and is not the product of legal specialists). "[T]o conceive of Islamic
law, or rather the Shari'a, strictly in terms of professionalism would be to miss the
peculiar quality of the popular Islamic passion for obedience to God's commands."
Id.
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Qur'an as a "framework of reference for all individual and collective

behaviours.

' 04

In one sense, the concepts in the Shari'a appear static. °5 The
Shari'a is derived from divine sources, which are discovered rather
than created.10 6 Under traditional Islamic views, no manmade law
may come into conflict with, or supersede, Islamic precepts.' 07 Thus,
under traditional notions, Shari'a law was "unquestionably supreme"
in all areas in which it governed. 10 8

104. Bernard Botiveau, Contemporary Reinterpretations of Islamic Law: The
Case ofEgypt, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY STUDIES
261, 263 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1993).
105. See Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, 35 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 56, 87 (2001) (holding that any system of law based on Shari'a would be
incompatible with democracy because the Shari'a "intervenes in all spheres of
private and public life in accordance with religious precepts" and "is stable and
invariable."), aff'd 13 Feb. 2003, available at 2001 WL 1819833. In 2001, the
European Court of Human Rights appeared to espouse this view that the Shari'a
"faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion." Id.
"Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of
public freedoms have no place in it." Id.; see also Moe, supra note 3, at 11. The
Court also noted that the Shari'a's views on penal law and the status of women
would come into conflict with the European Court:
It is difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and human rights while at
the same time supporting a regime based on Shari'a, which clearly diverges
from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and
criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it
intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious
precepts.
Refah Partisi,35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 87. However, according to Christian Moe, many
Muslims would agree that while the Shari'a may be "stable and invariable," it is so
"in a certain ideal, abstract sense" that distinguishes it from civic law. Moe, supra
note 3, at 13. The Refah Court did not distinguish between the various
interpretations of Shari'a in articulating its holding, thus suggesting its own
misunderstanding of the breadth of Muslim thought. Id. at 10. In addition, the
Court's holding "ignore[d] the diverse interpretation of these concepts by
Muslims." Id. at 1.
106. See Mayer, supra note 101, at 1022 (emphasizing that Islamic law derives
from divine sources and that rather than legislate, Muslim rulers defer to the divine
law).
107. See id. at 1023 (noting that the ruler may have quasi-legislative powers
only to implement or supplement the Shari'a law, which is ultimately supreme).
108. See id. (emphasizing that Islamic legal history provides no guidance for
Muslims seeking to reconcile conflicts between secular and religious laws); see
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Human agency, however, plays an important role in interpreting
the divine sources underlying the the Shari'a. 1°9 Modem
interpretations of the Shari'a and its application in Islamic politics
vary greatly.1 10 For instance, with regard to the appropriateness of a
modem Islamic state, some Muslims rely on the concept that Islam is
both religion and state to rationalize its harsh and coercive tactics,"'I
while others point out that compulsion in religion is an abomination

under the Qur'an, which "knows no such concept of an 'Islamic'
state, least of all one with the coercive powers of a modem

leviathan.""' Thus, an appeal to the Qur'an appears insufficient to
settle current problems."I3

Furthermore, many varying interpretations among Muslims are
based not upon interpretation, but rather upon the divergent cultures

of those who are reading the scripture. 1 4 In fact, many who espouse
abandoning Western notions and returning to a system of Islamic law
appear to receive motivation from nationalism as much as, if not

also Badr, supra note 4, at 98 (stating that Islamic law rejects the concept of
sovereignty and does not consider the state as an entity).
109. See Mayer, supra note 101, at 1022 (reiterating that Islamic Law derives
from divine sources and interpreting existing law is the role of the rulemakers).
110. See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. SISK, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: RELIGION, POLITICS,
AND POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 38-39 (1992) (summarizing specifically the
various approaches in Algeria and emphasizing the diversity of opinion among
Islamist movement groups); see also Anderson, supra note 12, at 41-42
(emphasizing the widespread skepticism and distrust of the Western human rights
agenda in the middle east).
111. See HEFNER, supra note 54, at 12 (noting that some modem Muslim
activists believe dissolving boundaries between private and public states will
facilitate the enforcement of the "high standards of Muslim morality").
112. Id. (addressing concerns that "concentrating power in [religious] rulers'
hands... only increases the likelihood that Islam's high ideals will be
subordinated to vulgar political intrigues"). Thus, a power grab will only end "by
degrading religion itself." Id.
113. See id. (implying that the Qur'an lacks the scope to cover modem issues).
114. See, e.g., SISK, supra note 110, at 38 (discussing Islamic groups in Algeria
that are implementing democratic programs, as opposed to the more militant
character of former groups); see also MAYER, supra note 22, at 156 (recognizing
that "human rights violations that seem at first blush to be tied to the Islamic
tradition often turn out upon closer inspection to be intertwined with local
politics.").
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more than, religion." 5 Thus, some scholars believe that modem
Muslims must rethink "the application of legal rules in various
Qur'anic verses. ' 16
Nevertheless, whether Muslims are able to or should neglect their
juristic precedent is controversial." 7 Although Muslims have looked
to differing schools of law or jurists at various times, they still
considered challenging the jurists' interpretations of the Shari'a as
unthinkable." 8 However, some Muslims suggest that a change in the
law of Shari'a might be possible through judicial review where
judges exercise ijtih d, or reasoning.' ' 9
B. THE POTENTIAL FOR INEQUALITY

Although current events would have one think otherwise, Islam's
toleration for adherents of other faiths is at least as favorable as the
Western world's historical treatment of non-Christian minorities. 2 °

115. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 183 (suggesting that the motivation behind
campaigns rejecting Western domination and reinstating Islamic law is both
nationalist and religious).
116. Id. at 137. For instance, Muslim feminists view restrictions on women's
rights as "cultural traditions disguised as religious precepts." Id. at 101; see also id.
at 98 (explaining that Muslim feminists "place the blame for what they see as
distortions of the original, authentic Islam on male interpreters of the Islamic
sources who had vested interests in the preservation of patriarchal privilege"). "By
and large Iranian and Saudi women who challenge their governments' treatment of
women do not reject Islam and often expressly reject Western values." Neal &
Hasan, supra note 25, at 10 n.3.
117. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 98 (discussing modem interpretations of
cultural traditions such as the inferior treatment of women). Some feminists reject
certain juristic traditions which they view as full of male bias. Id. at 101.
118. See id. at 98 (acknowledging Muslim reliance on the legal guidance of
these juristic treatises).
119. See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Appellate Review and Judicial
Independence in Islamic Law, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW: CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY STUDIES, supra note 104, at 49, 50-51 (indicating that while some

Muslim scholars believe the Shari'a does not provide for appellate review of a
judge's opinion, other Muslim scholars believe appellate review is possible under
Islamic law). Judicial review may also serve to "enhance[ ]public confidence and
credibility in court decisions." Id. at 63.
120. See Mayer, supra note 101, at 1024 (explaining that historically Islam
permitted non-Muslims living in areas under Muslim control to continue their
chosen laws and religion).
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The Qur'an provides that no compulsion should exist in religion; 2 '
rather, it holds that God will judge between believers and nonbelievers at the final judgment.'22
During the period of Islamic conquest, the Islamic state faced the
problem of how to treat non-Muslims in their conquered territories.'23
It solved the problem by setting up the legal system of dhimma.21' 4
The dhimmis, who included monotheists such as Jews and Christians,
but not pagans, ' were allowed to practice their religions and follow
their own community laws, "as long as they accepted a politically
subordinate, tributary status."' 2 6 In cases where non-Muslim law
conflicted with the Shari'a, Islamic law controlled. 27
Under the dhimma system, it was understood that non-Muslims
28
possessed neither political nor legal equality with Muslims.'
However, in modem times the use of a system of separation based
121. See AI-Ghunaimi, supra note 9, at 9-10 (discussing the Qur'an's mandate
that all persons in the Islamic state have freedom of thought and religion).
122. See id. at 11 (citing the QUR'AN 22:17 that "God will judge between those
who believe and the Jews, the Sabians, Christians and the Magians and the
idolaters, on the Day of Judgment.").
123. See id. at 10-11 (describing the system of dhimma, a legal concept which
permitted the conquered peoples to continue practicing their own religions). Such
peoples were known as dhimmis. Id.
124. See id. (noting that the origin of dhimma comes from the historical concept
ofjihad which believes that in war all property and inhabitants taken become part
of Islam); see also Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 18 (explaining that the dhimmi
is a pledge by Muslims to respect the person and property of the non-Muslims).
125. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 135 (maintaining that historically
polytheists and unbelievers had to embrace Islam or accept death); see also AlGhunaimi, supra note 9, at 11 (noting that the dhimmis did not include pagans).
126. Mayer, supra note 101, at 1024 (stating that prior to the dissipation of
intercommunal relations in the twentieth century, large Christian and Jewish
communities existed in many areas of the Middle East controlled by Muslim rule);
see also Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 18-19 (contending that traditional Islamic
Law requires that Muslims treat the non-Muslim dhimmis with the same level of
respect that a full citizen would receive).
127. See Mayer, supra note 101, at 1024 (noting that Islamic law also controlled
non-Muslims in matters affecting the interests of Muslims or the Muslim
community).
128. See id. (explaining that although the Islamic state protected the rights of
non-Muslims, they could never be true equals and would always maintain a
politically subordinate status).
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upon religious beliefs might reinforce the historical inequalities
between non-Muslims and Muslims by suggesting that a person's
righteousness can create a basis for unequal treatment.'2 9 The
negative result of such separation could be that non-Muslims would
not attain equal standing in an Islamic country employing a system
of differentiation based on religion. 130 For instance, some Muslim
countries mandate that the political leader must be Muslim.' 3 ' Even
assuming such a constitutional provision protects the autonomy of
the Muslim community, it also serves as a reminder to non-Muslims
that the value of their leadership skills and other qualities is less than
that of a Muslim.

132

A primary goal of Islam is to transcend material distinctions, such
as race and politics, and to create an Islamic community that brings
all people, equal before God, together in a community founded upon
God. 3 3 This goal may bring unity within the Muslim community, but
it also alienates non-Muslims. 34 "Islamic law attempts to
compensate for this disharmony by developing over time a precise

129. See Gamil Mohammed EI-Gindy, The Shura and Human Rights in Islamic
Law: The Relevance of Democracy, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164, 166
(Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000) (arguing that while Islamic law grants
equal protection to all persons, freedom of thought, right to express oneself, and
political rights, the Prophet acknowledged that Islam could accord people different
treatment based upon their righteousness).
130. See Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 19-20 (explaining that although the
Qur'an and Sunnah provide certain rights to dhimmis, Islam determined the status
of non-Muslims according to their obligations as dhimmis and their religious
orientation).
131. See, e.g., IRAN CONST. ch. IX, § 1, art. 115; MALAY CONST. art. 34; SAUDI
ARABIA CONST. arts. 1, 6 (setting forth the requirements to hold political office).
132. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 91 (discussing an interpretation of the
Shari'a that excluded non-Muslims and women from taking public office or
employment because they lacked the requisite qualifications of such positions).
133. See Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 23 (citing the QUR'AN 2:213, 10:19,
49:13, which explains that the distinguishing feature of an Islamic community is its
"single unwavering foundation: Allah" and that the goal of this bringing together is
to create a "focus for a social order around which a community can be formed and
through which justice can be realized").
134. See id. at 23-24 (observing that Islam recognizes the alienation inherent in
its definition of community and attempts to compensate for it by incorporating
non-Muslims into the affairs of state).
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relationship between the Muslim state and dhimmi communities
drawn from both the sources of Islamic law and the. assimilation of
local, traditional practices."' 35 Arguably, the Shari'a actually favors
the inclusion of non-Muslims in state affairs by providing guidelines
to reinforce ties between Muslims and non-Muslims. 36
While under classical conceptions of the Shari'a, Muslims and
non-Muslims share the same civil rights, including the right to life,
property, and religion, distinctions occur in political administration
and other affairs.'37 For instance, Shari'a law requires Muslims to
militarily protect non-Muslim citizens in exchange for the payment
of a special tax. 38 In addition, non-Muslims may trade and consume
wine and pork, outlawed by Islamic law, although they may not do
so openly.'39 Nevertheless, "Islam is very much built on a principle
of human equality; and in nearly every respect, a dhimmi's legal
capacity is intended to match that of a Muslim peer."' 4 °
Thus, whether an Islamic nation could create an environment
where all people are truly equal, both by the law and by cultural
norms, regardless of religious affiliation or gender, depends on how
the country interprets the Shari'a.'4 ' Western notions of equality and
equal protection are somewhat of a foreign concept to Islam. 42 For
those Muslims wishing to uphold traditional hierarchical systems,

135. Id. at 24.
136. See id. (discussing the QUR'AN 60:8, which discusses showing kindness
and justice to those of other religions, as one of the bases for improving relations
between Muslims and non-Muslims).
137. See id. at 25-26 (explaining that while non-Muslims engage in matters of
state, the ultimate head of state must be Muslim).
138. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 135 (examining the jizya, a special
capitation tax that Islam required the dhimmis to pay for military protection and in
lied of military service).
139. See Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 31-32 (explaining that the limitation
on public consumption is based on concerns that these displays might encourage
believers to apostatize).
140. Id. at 32-33.

141. See id. at 47 (maintaining that Islamic law provides rules for both the
required and recommended treatment of the dhimmis; therefore, their actual
treatment depends upon the interpretation and application of the laws).
142. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 89 (mentioning that Islamic law does not
have a constitutional counterpart to the principal of equal protection).
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equality means simply that Shari'a law should apply equally to all

within an

persons

established

category,

regardless

of their

classification. 143 Thus, the law treated all male Muslims equally, and
all male non-Muslims equally. 144 This interpretation of equality

equal protection under a law that
assumes "that it is possible to have 145
treatment.
unequal
mandates
itself
On the other hand, many liberal Muslims suggest that a
differentiation based on faith only applies when standing individually
before God and forms no basis for any civil inequities. 146 They point
out that the passage allowing such differentiation "is of questionable

authenticity... 'because it is inconsistent with the many Qur'anic
verses that call for tolerance.' ' ' 147 Furthermore, many liberal Muslims
assert that the Qur'an permits anyone to participate in shura, or
community consultation, regardless of religious affiliation or

gender.

148

143. See id. (explaining that when Muslims initially encountered the concept of
equal protection, they generally believed that Shari'a law did not discriminate if
those persons in the same categories received equal legal treatment, even if that
treatment was not the equivalent of the other group).
144. See id. (noting that this equality does not mean that Muslims and nonMuslims receive the same legal rights or even that both groups receive similar
treatment).
145. Id. 89-90 (analyzing the Arabic version of the Universal Islamic
Declaration of Human Rights which purports to grant all people equality under the
Shari'a law and concluding that the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human
Rights does not provide equal protection that complies with international standards
because it relies upon pre-modem formulations, which include discriminatory
provisions).
146. See SISK, supra note 110,, at 20 ("The fundamental inequality between
believers and infidels is an inequality before God and not one that implies an
inequality in civic rights and duties."). This group argues that inequities would run
contrary to the Qur'anic mandate of tolerance. Id. Additionally, such passages as
the one that states that those who change their religion should be killed have been
found by such liberal Muslims to be of questionable authenticity. Id. Rather,
Muslims are specifically directed "to be tolerant of other religious beliefs" and
"non-Muslims will be judged by God" alone. Id.
147. Id. (citing Muhammad Faour, a peace fellow at the United States Institute
of Peace and a professor of sociology at the American University of Beirut).
148. See El-Gindy, supra note 129, at 166 (explaining that the Qur'an does not
mandate any qualifications for participation in shura). Further, no provision in the
Qur'an or Sunna excludes the participation of women in shura. Id. According to
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Finally, liberal scholars argue that at a minimum Islamic practice
can change to accommodate the needs of the time, even if doctrine
cannot. 149 In the ancient world, practical applications changed to
evolve with community needs. 150 For instance, dhimmis originally
consisted of only those who believed in only one God and the Holy
Book; Islam still labeled members of all other religious groups as
either polytheists or unbelievers and were forced to either convert to
Islam or face a penalty of death. 5' However, original practices
adjusted when Islam spread to the East, to allow Muslims to co-exist
peacefully with Hindus and others.'
The distinctions between
Muslims and non-Muslims again decreased in the 1800s as secular
nationalism became a political force in the Muslim world. 5 3 The
evolution of Islam's increasing tolerance for non-Muslims suggests
that Muslims may be able to find room for international notions
regarding equal protection within the strictures of Islam.'54 Finding a
basis for democracy may mean looking past the Shari'a to the core
doctrines upon which the Shari'a rests. 55 Some of the "original
EI-Gindy, those who believe that Islam does not permit the participation of women
base their views on irrational concerns, not sound Islamic principals or rules. Id.
149. See Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 13 (noting that reinterpretations of
Islamic precepts and constitutionalism removed many of the legal inequalities that
existed in the past and aided in extending universal human rights to all citizens).
150. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 135 (explaining that early Islamic rulers
developed the system of dhimmis because numerous conquered Christians and
Jews refused to embrace Islam).
151. See id. (observing that pre-modem Shari'a doctrine tolerated the Christian
and Jewish religions, but refused to accept other faiths).
152. See id. (relating that the old practice of presenting conquered non-Muslims
with acceptance of Islam or death adjusted in order for peoples to co-exist).
153. See id. at 136 (stating that in many ways non-Muslims gained the same
citizen rights as Muslims). Mayer further explains that in today's society, the
waning of secular nationalism coupled with the increased influence of Islam as
political ideology has caused issues regarding the status of non-Muslims to
resurface. Id.
154. See id. at 136-37 (asserting that the ideology that Islam and the tenets of
human rights law should be in harmony led some Muslims to embrace the
possibility that "full equality for all citizens is compatible with Islam").
155. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 137 (observing various interpretations of
Islamic law which demonstrate that Islam may allow for absolute equality of
Muslims and non-Muslims). As an example, the teachings of Mahmud Muhammad
Taha, distinguished between Qur'anic verses meant to govern the early Islamic
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sources and examples from early Islamic history ... demonstrate the
tolerant and egalitarian strains that have from the beginning
' 56
constituted important components of the Islamic tradition."'

A final reason many Muslims support protection for non-Muslims
is that Islamization has the potential to affect Muslims as much as
non-Muslims.' 57 Muslims who espouse ideas contrary to "the version
of Islam endorsed by governments and allied religious

establishments" may be "reclassified as non-Muslims or heretics."'5 8
Thus, while some modern Islamists may argue for a reinstatement of
the Shari'a rules governing dhimmi status, the fact remains that many
Islamic nations have adopted constitutions reflecting international

human rights values as well as modern notions of citizenship that
prohibit discrimination based on religion. 15 9 "Proponents of
Islamization who demand the adoption of Islamic forms of

government and the imposition of laws discriminating against nonMuslims have to combat other political factions inside their own
societies that favor respecting modern norms

.... 160

community and those meant to possess enduring validity. Id. In doing so, Taha
established Islamic principles which ended religious discrimination. Id.
156. Id. at 136-37 (setting forth an approach to Islam that creates agreement
with international law by suppressing or discarding aspects of the Shari'a that
cause disharmony). One such example may be that Shari'a restrictions keeping
non-Muslims from holding high political offices no longer apply in the current
world, which could not have been envisioned by medieval Islamic theorists. Id.
Early Shari'a rules governing non-Muslims reflected the situation of that time,
when the Islamic community was weak and faced with determining how to deal
with non-Muslims among them while protecting against outside military threats.
Id.
157. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 134 (explaining that Muslims in the
majority may regard other Muslims whose beliefs are in the minority, also termed
"dissidents" and "nonconformists," as non-Muslims).
158. Id. Such Muslims holding minority views have the same interest in
protecting non-Muslims because they could find themselves facing similar
treatment. Id.
159. See id. at 133 (stating that Muslim countries adopted Western constitutional
models prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion).
160. Id.
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C. THE ABILITY TO CONVERT

While Muslims have historically shown tolerance towards
differences within their own ranks, 6' one well-known, but often
misunderstood, attribute of Islam is its discouragement of, and
penalty for, conversion to other faiths.1 62 If Shari'a law were to
govern in an Islamic country, a notable concern would be whether
Muslims would have the ability to convert to other faiths and take
advantage of another faith's set of personal laws.
Even Muslims who believe in equality and tolerance between
believers and non-believers have a much more difficult time
accepting the right of a Muslim to convert from Islam to another
"' This difficulty stems from the importance of individual and
faith. 63
group duties to others and society. 61 An Islamic community has a
duty to protect its members from harm, including apostasy.'65
Because "Islam is the one true way to Paradise, it is, as a practical
matter, in the Muslim's best interests not to apostatize, and it is
compassionate of him or her to prevent fellow Muslims from falling
away." 66 Thus, the moral duty Muslims owe each other supercedes

161. See Mayer, supra note 101, at 1023-24 (explaining that pre-modem Islam
tolerated different interpretations of Islam, and Muslims could choose for
themselves which school of thought to follow, even if that school contradicted the
current political leader's preference).
162. See Tahir Mahmood, Islamic Law and State Legislation on Religious
Conversion in India, in

ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY

STUDIES, supra note 104, at 159, 185 (noting that Islam is not the only religion to
discourage conversion, either through institutional or cultural pressures). For
instance, the Hindu Code in India contains many inducements to keep Hindus,
Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs from converting to other religions, such as Islam or
Christianity. Id.
163. See Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 43 (commenting that apostasy is an
offense to Allah and the state).
164. See id. at 43-44 (explaining that "[a]postacy also has political implications
since the state is to be founded on Islamic principles, if not Islamic law. In many
ways the state as a practical matter is dependent on the individual's membership in
Islam to maintain its internal cohesiveness.").
165. See id. at 44 (noting that apostasy is a "serious offense" even in more
lenient states and that a "legal stigma" remains when anyone encourages another to
leave the Faith).
166. Id. at 45.
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any earthly notion of individual freedom. 67 Muslims who are
fortunate enough to have been blessed by their religion may not
choose to16s convert, and non-Muslims may not proselytize among
Muslims.

Nevertheless, the meaning and consequences of apostasy under
Shari'a are not entirely clear. On the religious side, apostasy refers to
the act of "turning from Islam after being a Muslim.

'169

It may

"occur[] either through words or deeds which put an end to one's
adherence to Islam, such as the rejection of fundamental principles of
faith." 70 A system relying on Shari'a law that imposes punishments
for such a change of religious faith appears to depart from the
generally recognized fundamental right to freedom of religion.
Nevertheless, some Muslims argue that freedom of religion involves
the freedom to have a religion, not freedom from religion."7 Thus,
167. See id. (affirming that this prevention of conversion constitutes a
transcendent moral duty which is of greater importance than "earthly rights").
168. See Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 42-43 (explaining that allowing nonMuslims to co-exist with Muslims gives them the chance to convert to Islam); see
also Mayer, supra note 101, at 1025 (observing that Islamic communities
encouraged conversion to Islam but punished conversions from Islam); Carolyn
Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The Search for a
Guiding Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 385,
386 (describing the related issues that arose in the debates surrounding the
adoption of Ithe Universal Declaration and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights). But see Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 42-43 (declaring that
despite Islam's tolerance for those of other faiths, such "tolerance by no means
indicates harmony or philosophical acquiescence to the incongruities between
Islam and dhimmi religions, no matter how sympathetic Islam may be."). See
generally supra Part III.B (discussing that when the prohibition of apostasy by
Muslims becomes a legal mandate, it may further the differentiation between nonMuslims and Muslims as it suggests that Islam is superior to other religions).
Regardless of what any religious adherent may personally feel about his or her
religion, when this feeling of superiority becomes part of law, it has a high
likelihood of resulting in discrimination. Part III.B.
169. Muhammad Abu-Hassan, Islamic Criminal Law, in JUSTICE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 9, at 79, 85.
170. Id.
171. See Arzt, supra note 8, at 373 (describing freedom of religion as
encompassing "not only the freedom to hold theistic beliefs but also the freedom to
hold non-theistic beliefs as well as the freedom to change one's religion or belief,
all without coercion or discrimination"). According to Arzt, under traditional
Islamic law, any rebuff or refusal of Islamic law was tantamount to a criticism of
the faith. Id.
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Muslims' right to hold and practice their religion includes the right to
prohibit apostasy from their faith and to secure their community.
Apostasy may exist not only in a religious form, but also as an act
against Islam as a state. 172 Turning against the Islamic state, when set
up as a political entity, could have political repercussions of
7
destabilizing the political regime and destroying cohesiveness.1 1
According to some modem scholars, the Qur'an's emphasis is on the
latter form of apostasy - that which threatens political integrity that only
rather than merely religious unbelief. 74 Thus, it is possible
75
criminally.
apostasy as a political crime is punishable
The latter view appears to have support in the Qur'an, which
mandates that no compulsion should exist in religion'7 6 and reserves
judgment to God at the last day. 7 7 Arguably, Qur'anic punishments
for apostasy only apply to those who actually "boycott the
community ... and challenge its legitimate leadership," rather than

172. See Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 43 (noting that apostasy has political
implications in a state founded on Islamic principles).
173. See id. at 43-44 (commenting that an Islamic state, as a political entity,
relies on membership in Islam to maintain itself).
174. See id. at 44 (stating that the Qur'an's concern for apostasy lies with the
"political threat of religious unbelief"); see also QUR'AN 9:29 (ordering followers
of Islam to "fight those who believe not in Allah").
175. See Abu-Hassan, supra note 169, at 85 (distinguishing between religious
and political apostasy and explaining that the criminal punishment for apostasy
might only apply to political apostasy, which is a generally punishable
constitutional violation).
176. See QUR'AN 2:256 (The Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and
Guidance) (explaining the Qur'an verse "There shall be no compulsion in religion"
to mean that compulsion and religious belief are not compatible concepts because
the element of faith in religion is meaningless if by force); see also Al-Ghunaimi,
supra note 9, at 9 (noting the existence of freedom of thought and religion in Islam
granted by the Qur'an).
177. See AI-Ghunaimi, supra note 9, at 9-10 (asserting that one may use force
in only two instances: to warn enemies and to establish order); see also QUR'AN
10:99 (stating, "Are you going to compel the people to believe, except by God's
dispensation?") The Qur'an also states, "Surely the believers and the Jews,
Nazareans (Christians) and the Sabians, whosoever believes in God and the Last
Day, and whosoever does right, shall have his reward with his Lord and will
neither have fear nor regret." Id. at 2:62. Nevertheless, it seems likely that some
Islamic states might rationalize their use of force against Muslim apostates and
non-believers as a means to keep order.
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to those who simply convert away from Islam. 7 ' The traditional
death penalty for apostasy notably does not exist in the Qur'an and is
only evidenced from examples from the Prophet Muhammad's
life. 79 This penalty could have been established merely to protect the
public order. 8 ' Thus, conceivably, religious freedom under the
Qur'an is similar to Western notions of religious freedom.'
Muslims themselves may have a personal interest in allowing
apostasy because criminalizing apostasy may create difficulties for
"Muslims who adhere to doctrines that are out of keeping with
whatever standard of orthodoxy is currently being espoused by
powerful
Islamic
institutions
or
governments
pursuing
Islamization."' 8 2 Although traditionally Islam tolerated varying views
of Islamic theology and law, modem governments advocating
Islamization often espouse only one strand of Islam.'8 3 If a regime's
ideology and legitimacy become tied to only one version of the faith,
Muslims who do not follow the prevailing view are likely to be
found to be apostates.' 84 Thus, criminalizing apostasy may not only
keep Muslims from converting to other faiths, but also may keep

178.

MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, ISLAMIC LAW IN MALAYSIA: ISSUES AND

DEVELOPMENTS

215 (2000) (noting that one must do more than merely convert

away from Islam to receive severe punishment); see also MAYER, supra note 22,
at 158 (according to one scholar, Muhammad only applied the death penalty to

apostasy "when the act of apostasy from Islam was linked to an act of political
betrayal of the community."). Thus, the crime of apostasy was more akin to treason
or sedition. Id.
179. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 157-58 (noting that the traditional rules on

apostasy come from incidents in Muhammad's life and other historical events that
can be interpreted in a variety of ways; no Qur'anic verse requires an earthly
penalty for apostasy).
180. See Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 43-44 (asserting that an Islamic state
depends on membership to maintain cohesiveness).
181. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 136, 157 (observing that many Muslims
favor reform of or abandonment of the apostasy penalty in order to embrace a
religious freedom and accord with international law).
182. Id. at 151.
183. See id. (distinguishing the differing views and degrees of toleration of old

and modem Islamic law).
184. See id. (asserting that Muslims who follow views or interpretations not
currently being espoused by the government of an Islamic institution can also find
themselves in difficulty).
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them from developing their own faith within the framework of
Islam."85
Nevertheless, even if an Islamic state were to allow conversion,
extreme cultural pressure exists to continue on in the Islamic faith.
The case of NorAishah Bokhari in Malaysia, a state operating under
Islamic law, is a recent example. In 1997, Ms. Bokhari renounced
Islam so she could marry a Roman Catholic." 6 The Islamic
constituency of Malaysia reacted by publishing and circulating
approximately 100,000 posters that urged Bokhari to return to the
fold and pushed the government through the news media to arrest
Muslim apostates.1 7 After Bokhari's family located her and
succeeded in bringing her home, she again disappeared. This time,
she wrote to her attorney asking him to appeal her right to choose her
religion to the Supreme Court. 88 The Islamic community reacted by
seeking to draft a law to prevent apostasy.189
In one sense, such cultural coercion suggests that the prevailing
Malaysian law did not reflect the public sentiment. However, at the
time of this article, the Islamic community has not gained enough
political momentum to push the bill through.1 90 In any case, cultural
coercion is an unfortunate residual to any system that attempts to

185. See id. at 151, 156 ("From a penalty designed to secure inclusion within the
Islamic fold, apostasy had been transformed into a means of excluding believing

Muslims from their place in the community."); see also Neal & Hasan, supra note
25, at 44 (stating that "Islamic law's prohibition against apostasy quickly triggers

human rights concerns, though more so for Muslims than for dhimmis ....
Presumably, one may compare Islam and a dhimmi religion as long as the
comparison does not provoke apostasy; but if that is true, one could then argue that
the likelihood of any authentic dialectic is questionable at best.").
186. KAMALI, ISLAMIC LAW INMALAYSIA, supra note 178, at 203 (nothing that

NoirAishah renounced Islam and left her parents' home to live with the family of
her fiance).
187. See id. at 204 (reporting that the Islamic party used its official newspaper to
pressure the government to use the Internal Security Act to arrest apostates).
188. See id. at 206 (providing a detailed explanation of NorAishah's request to
choose her own religion).
189. Id.
190. But see supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing the reaction
to the case of Shah Bano in India).
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modernize.19' Despite such cultural forces, an Islamic state
implementing a system of Shari'a could at least guard against
institutional coercion by allowing individuals freedom to change
religious preferences. 92 Such an institutional framework might assist
in overcoming other forms of coercion.

CONCLUSION
As noted in the previous section, Islamic tenets are not necessarily
incompatible with the protection of both individual and group rights.
It appears likely that an Islamic state might best achieve the
democratic protection of human rights by encouraging religious
adherents of all faiths to adhere more devoutly to their own
principles.' 9 3 Furthermore, the democratic protection of human rights
will also be achieved by allowing differences of opinion regarding
religious principles into the public debate, rather than removing all
religious traditions from the public arena.' 94 "If we are to understand
anything at all about what has happened in the past and is happening
today in the Muslim world, we must appreciate the universality and
centrality of religion as a factor in the lives of the Muslim
peoples."' 95
191. See Moe, supra note 3,at 9-10 (noting that religious communities may
reformulate their laws to accommodate human rights in the modem nation-state).
192. But see id. at 9 (recognizing that as a practical matter, however, the
considerable pressure that a religious community may exact on its members to
retain their religious allegiance limits the freedom to change one's religion,
particularly in Islam because of its apostasy ban).
193. See Wael B. Hallaq, "Muslim Rage" and Islamic Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
1705, 1710 (2003) (observing that Islamic law operated outside of state and
government influence with great success until the middle of the nineteenth century
when conventional scholars relegated Islamic law to the status of a relic of the past
incapable of change); see also Jackson, supra note 53, at 105 (noting that an
Islamic state is perfectly capable of recognizing that some of its citizens are not
Muslim and that their rights grow out of a different tradition than that of the
majority Muslim population).
194. See Hallaq, supra note 193, at 1718-19 (finding the roots of modem legal
conflict in the disconnection between religion and government in Muslim
communities).
195. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL
LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1990). Islam's role in
the major social and political movements of modern Muslim history is due to the
religion's interconnectedness with its followers' identities. Id.
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A final example is worth noting; in India, religious law governs
personal affairs and the Constitution of India provides for all people,
among other things, the positive guarantees of equality, freedom of
conscience and belief, and freedom of religious practice and
propagation.1 96 Conversion is allowed both to and from Islam, and
the consequence of conversion is that a person is subject to a new set
of religious laws. 197 A person can easily convert without providing
evidence to any civil authority of any depth of belief or even
knowledge of the basic tenets of his or her new faith. 198
The Muslim personal law in India is the only law to allow a man
to have more than one wife; thus, non-Muslim men frequently
convert to Islam so they can marry again without having to go
through the cumbersome process of divorce.199 While this practice
initially seems unethical and unfair to the first wife, were Indian
courts to apply Qur'anic principles in determining whether such a
convert could marry a second wife, the courts would likely find that
this practice directly contradicts Islamic mandates. In Islam, a man
may only marry more than one wife if he can treat them all with
equity, but if he cannot treat them with equity, then he may only
have one wife. 20 0 Because a man converting to Islam solely to marry
again presumably would not have the desire to treat his first,
unwanted wife with the same respect and love as the second wife,
such a man could be prohibited from this practice simply by applying
the tenets of his new "faith.""'' Thus, while the notion of converting

196. See Mahmood, supra note 162, at 161 n. 7 (citing INDIA CONST. arts. 14,

25, 26).
197. See id. at 179 (explaining the effect of conversion from Islam in India).
198. See id. at 176 (stating that "conversion to Islam is technically based on the

convert's claim").
199. See id. at 189-90 (describing one basis for fraudulent or "sham"
conversions to Islam).
200. See QUR'AN 4:3 (providing that the unrestricted number of wives during
the "Times of Ignorance" was to be strictly limited to a maximum of four wives,
but still requiring that the husband be able to treat all wives equally); see also AlGhunaimi, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that "if a husband is unable to achieve justice
between his wives, he is allowed to marry only one woman.").
201. See AI-Ghunaimi, supra note 9, at 3-4 (noting that the Qur'an recognizes
the inherent difficulty of being just to two wives and maintaining that there is no
polygamy in Islam).
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to Islam merely to obtain a second, more desirable wife would
of fairness, Islam itself
appear at first to be contrary to concepts
202
contains a solution to the difficulty.

As previously explained, a successful society must be based on the
morality inherent in it, rather than on externally imposed morals that
may or may not reflect the popular consensus. 203 Like all states, an
Islamic state seeking to implement a system of religious law could
implement safeguards to protect the human rights of all its citizens,
including appellate review of cases decided under religious law and a
strong policy of equal protection. 2 4 Regardless of how an Islamic
state chooses to structure its government, any process of reform will
only be successful if Muslims are allowed to be Muslims and to
retain their core ideals. 205 The final realization of human rights in the
Islamic world may not occur overnight, but even the Prophet
Muhammad recognized social reform as an achievable, but gradual,
20 6

goal.

202. See Hamid M. Khan, Note, Nothing Is Written: Fundamentalism,
Revivalism, Reformism and the Fate of Islamic Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 273,
330-31 (2002) (discussing Islam's role in positively reforming the status and
societal perceptions of women).
203. Supra Part I.A. For instance, one commentator notes that Malaysian
Islamic courts play a key role in defining Islam's role in modem society, as well as
providing ground for debate for ongoing struggles concerning ethnic groups,
religious communities, social classes, and political parties. See PELETZ, supra note
1, at 3 (recognizing the need to look within Malaysia's cultural, social, and
political system to create a coherent moral framework); see also id. at 6 (noting
that the legal system in Malaysia is pluralistic and embodies three major traditions
of law: customary law, national (statutory) law, and Islamic law, which is relevant
to Malays and all other Muslims in a limited range of affairs).
204. See Moe, supra note 3, at 7-8 (addressing arguments for a move away from
state-centered fundamentalism that exclusively interprets religion towards a civil
society that appreciates freedom of conscience).
205. See id. at 22 (propositioning that Muslims will only be able to have an
authentic exercise of their religion if they are guaranteed human rights and
democratic freedoms).
206. See Neal & Hasan, supra note 25, at 38 (discussing the Prophet's
preference for gradual social reform rather than the use of revolutionary methods
and his efforts to improve the status of slaves and ultimate intention of
emancipation).

